Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 46, Number 2 (Summer 2008)

Article 2

Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary
Duties for Ethical Investment
Benjamin J. Richardson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons
Article

Citation Information
Richardson, Benjamin J.. "Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment." Osgoode Hall Law Journal
46.2 (2008) : 243-291.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol46/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical
Investment
Abstract

This article argues that environmental law must target the financial sector, which sponsors and profits from
environmental pillage. The rise of a system of finance capitalism has made the financial sector a crucial
economic sector. A long-standing movement for socially responsible investment (SRI) has recently begun to
advocate environmental standards for financiers. While the SRI movement has gained more influence in
recent years, it has come at the price of jettisoning its former emphasis on ethical investment in favour of an
instrumental, business case approach. Some modest legal reforms to improve the quality and extent of SRI
have yet to make a tangible difference. An alternative legal strategy to promote SRI for environmental
sustainability is suggested based on reforming the fiduciary duties of financial institutions. Fiduciary duties
tied to concrete performance standards such as sustainability indicators provide a way to restore the ethical
imperatives of SRI.
Keywords

Environmental law; Financial institutions--Investments; Investments--Moral and ethical aspects; Social
responsibility in banking

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol46/iss2/2

243

Putting Ethics into Environmental Law:
Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment
BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON *
This article argues that environmental taw must target the financial sector, which sponsors
and profits from environmental pillage. The rise of a system of finance capitalism has made
the financial sector a crucial economic sector. A tong-standing movement for socially
responsible investment (SRI] has recently begun to advocate environmental standards for
financiers. White the SRI movement has gained more influence in recent years, it has come
at the price of jettisoning its former emphasis on ethical investment in favour of. an
instrumental, business case approach. Some modest legal reforms to improve the quality
and extent of SRI have yet to make a tangible difference. An alternative legal strategy to
promote SRI for environmental sustainability is suggested based on reforming the fiduciary
duties of financial institutions. Fiduciary duties tied to concrete performance standards
such as sustainability indicators provide a way to restore the ethical imperatives of SRI.
Cet article avance que le droit environnementat doit viser le secteur financier, qui
cautionne le pillage de l'environnement et en profile. L'av~nement d'un syst~me de
capitalisme financier a transform6 le secteur financier en un secteur conomique capital.
Un mouvement en faveur des investissements socia!ement responsables (ISRI, n6 depuis
longtemps, a r6cemment commenc6 6 pr6coniser des normes environnementales pour les
financiers. Parce que te mouvement ISR a accru son influence ces derni~res ann~es, it a do
att6nuer l'importance qu'it attachait auparavant aux investissements 6thiques, en faveur
d'une analyse commerciale instrumentale de cas. On attend toujours de voir si quelques
modestes r6formes juridiques cherchant 6 am6tiorer [a qualit6 et [a port6e des ISR,
op&rent une diff6rence tangible. Une strat6gie juridique alternative, permettant
d'encourager L'ISR en faveur de [a viabilit6 environnementale est sugg6re sur [a base de
[a r6forme des devoirs fiduciaires des 6tablissements financiers. Les devoirs fiduciaires
li6s 6 des normes concretes de rendement, telles que des indicateurs de viabilit6,
repr6sentent une facon de r6tablir les impbratifs 6thiques de l'ISR.

•

Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. This article draws partly on
the author's new book, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen Polluters
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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I.

RENEWING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS OF environmental law worldwide provide little
space for ethics. Their stock-in-trade includes bureaucratic licenses, technology
prescriptions, market incentives, and informational standards. They treat
environmental management as a matter of business acumen, technological
innovation, or obedience to regulatory commands. While all of these responses
in theory can be considered reflective of some underlying ethical stance, such as
utilitarianism, they do not reflect rigorous baseline standards to safeguard ecological
systems over the long term. The mechanical, pragmatic oudook of environmental
law reflects broader characteristics of modern governance, which tends to eschew
morality and virtue.1 The state's legitimacy and success are measured primarily by
its performance as an economic manager. This economic rationality both fuels
environmental degradation and constrains policy solutions when financial or
other "concrete" grounds to motivate action are seemingly lacking.
A further fundamental weakness of environmental law regimes is their
focus on the front-line companies that visibly pollute or exploit natural
resources, rather than on their financial sponsors. Several decades of such
1.

Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1981) at 233-36; David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity: An Enquiry
into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) at 220.
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regulation have hardly dented environmentally unsustainable trends. Financial
institutions, such as banks, pension plans, and mutual funds, have systemically
been remote to these environmental and social consequences. 2 The financial
sector leverages economic development by raising capital for corporations and
managing financial risks. 3 In addition to supplying funds, financiers as
shareholders also acquire influence to advocate changes in corporate policy.'
Despite such relationships, financial institutions have traditionally not been
held legally accountable for the ultimate consequences of the transactions they
fund. Causal relationships between finance and environmental impacts are
separated widely across time and space, frequently obscuring holistic responsibility
for the degradation of the environment. Legitimately, financial institutions may
be construed as the unseen polluters, who wittingly or unwittingly contribute
to environmental problems they sponsor and profit from.'
Both of these deficiencies of modern systems of environmental regulation
could be challenged by the long-standing movement for socially responsible
investment (SRI). Although what is "socially responsible" can obviously be read
in many ways, SRI generally seeks to make financiers more considerate of their
social and environmental impacts over the long term. Originally known more
commonly as "ethical investment," the SRI movement began in the anti-slavery
campaigns of the Quakers in the 1700s. Today, it calls for investment boycotts
or other financial pressures on firms that engage in a host of concerning
practices, such as disregarding human rights, selling unethical products such as

2.

Juan Rada & Alex Trisoglio, "Capital Markets and Sustainable Development" (1992) 27:3
Colum. J. World Bus. 42; William Thomas, "The Green Nexus: Financiers and Sustainable
Development" (2001) 13 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 899.

3.

For an introduction, see Marc Levinson, Guide to FinancialMarkets (New York: Bloomberg
Press, 2006).

4.

Stuart Gillan & Laura Starks, "Relationship Investing and Shareholder Activism by
Institutional Investors" (1995) [working paper, University of Texas].

5.

Environmental issues are not the only subject of connection between financial institutions
and their culpability for social problems. Take, for example, the litigation ensued by
Holocaust survivors against Swiss and German banks for their collusion with the Nazis'
expropriation of Jewish property. Yet another example is the lawsuit launched by Black
South Africans brought under the United States (US) Alien Tort Claims Act against
international financiers for supporting the former apartheid regime: Peter van der Auweraert,
"Holocaust Reparation Claims Fifty Years After: The Swiss Banks Litigation" (2002) 71
Nordic J. Int'l L. 557.
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tobacco, or failing to seek to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Thus,
central to the traditional goals of the SRI movement has been the compulsion
to choose investments on ethical grounds that promote the public interest
rather than invest only to maximize financial returns for private reward.
Until recently, the SRI movement was regarded by mainstream financial
institutions as a subversive, fringe sector. That derogatory attitude is starting to
change as some financiers recognize that the social or environmental behaviour
of companies they support can have salient financial repercussions. A polluting
company, for instance, may attract adverse publicity or even liability in a
manner that affects its solvency. Consequently, a new style of SRI is emerging
that increasingly jettisons any pretensions to ethical criteria, focusing instead on
the business case for investing responsibly. SRI actors increasingly frame their
choices on a business case, on the assumption that SRI will make investors
prosperous rather than merely virtuous. While business case SRI has led to
some growth in the SRI market, because many social and environmental issues
cannot be financially quantified using techniques familiar to financial
institutions, the sector's growth faces structural limits. Moreover, the mostly
voluntary standards of SRI have enabled fungible and dubious investment
practices masquerading as ethical choices to proliferate.
This article assesses how a more ethical approach to environmental
regulation could be developed, in the context of the financial sector, through
legal standards for SRI. It is not confined to examining these issues in a
Canadian context, and canvasses the policy and legal context internationally,
including reforms in. the United States and Europe. The article touches on a
rather novel topic for most environmental law scholars and policy-makers,
many of whom have yet to appreciate the potential of the financial sector as a
pathway for promoting sustainable development. The financial sector is
profoundly influential on the state of the planet, given that it is where
"wholesale" decisions regarding future development, and thus environmental
pressures, arise. Targeting the financial sector through SRI reforms could
reduce the burden on current front-line regulatory controls, as companies
passing the rigours of SRI standards should be easier to regulate at an
operational level. Also, given the growth of cross-border investment, which
allows financiers to invest in foreign markets lacking rigorous human rights and
environmental standards, it is crucial to impose standards in the locales where
funds are actually raised.
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Yet, left largely to the vagaries of the market without legal imprimatur, SRI
has yet to engender widespread change. Pious calls for more ethical conduct, on
their own, will unlikely motivate change in the austere financial world. Some
tentative legal reforms to facilitate SRI have arisen in the last decade or so, but
have achieved only modest results. These reforms include transparency
regulations requiring funds to be more explicit about their SRI policies,
taxation incentives for environmental investment, and improved shareholder
rights to enable investors to engage with corporations from within. Rarely,
however, have financial institutions been told how they should invest, and even
less frequently have they been held liable for environmental problems
connected to the companies they choose to finance.
This article explores a different route to ethical investment for
sustainability, based on reforming the fiduciary duties of financial institutions.
When financial institutions manage investors' money, the legal system imposes
fiduciary standards for these institutions to invest carefully in the best interests
of investors. Fiduciary duties have traditionally been understood to require
maximization of financial returns, without regard to collateral costs or benefits
to other interests. While these fiduciary duties are now being interpreted in a
way that accommodates business case SRI, they certainly constrain ethical
investment. A spectrum of reforms is conceived in this article, ranging from
mild procedural reforms to mandatory sustainability performance standards.
Because financial institutions are not natural persons, they need formal rules
and procedures to play the equivalent role that virtues play for individuals.
These arguments are premised on a specific understanding of what should
constitute SRI or ethical investment. There will always be some room for
individuals to choose lawful investments according to their own moral scruples,
such as eschewing financial ties to companies that engage in activities they find
*personally offensive, whether it be manufacturing alcohol or operating a casino.
But where financial institutions manage the assets of millions of people and
have the capacity to exert huge economic influence, they must be governed by
environmental standards that protect natural systems for the long term. They
should be regarded as institutions with special public responsibilities based on
ecological ethics. Today, barely a week passes without alarming environmental
news. In 2005, the United Nations Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board
(MEAB) warned that "[h]uman activity is putting such strain on the natural
functions of the Earth that the ability of the planet's ecosystems to sustain
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future generations can no longer be taken for granted." 6 In an era of finance
capitalism, where pension plans, insurance companies, and banks manage
financial empires that vastly exceed those of states, the kind of development
they fund must be scrutinized to avert the disasters feared by the MEAB.7
Therefore, the ultimate goal of SRI, as a potential new arm of
environmental law, must be to achieve sustainability. 8 Sustainability concerns
the fundamental integrity of ecological systems (global climate and other vital
life-supporting services) and socio-economic issues that may impinge upon
environmental management (e.g., health, human rights, and poverty).9
Although it remains a contested discourse, sustainable development describes
the processes by which the goal of sustainability can be achieved. Maintaining
ecological integrity requires that the use of renewable resources not exceed their
rate of regeneration, and that rates of pollution remain within the assimilative
capacity of the environment." Sustainability, therefore, values different
principles and methods of decision making, entailing a more long-term
perspective that protects the interests of all life.11 In 1992, some 1,700 world
scientists issued their "Warning to Humanity," calling for "[a] new ethic ... a
new attitude towards discharging our responsibility for caring for ourselves and
for the earth."12 Other solutions address the symptoms without confronting the
underlying causes of humanity's unsustainable trajectory.

6.

Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board (MEAB), Living Beyond Our Means: NaturalAssets
and Human Well-Being (Statement from the Board) (MEAB, 2005) at 5, online:
<http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/BoardStatement.aspx>

7.

See Julie Froud, Adam Leaver & Karel Williams, "New Actors in a Financialised Economy
and the Remaking of Capitalism," (2007) 12 New Pol. Econ. 339.

8.

See especially Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood, eds., EnvironmentalLawfor
Sustainability:A Reader (Oxford: Hart, 2006).

9.

See Paul Harrison, The ThirdRevolution: Population,Environmentand a Sustainable World
(London: Penguin, 1992); Gretchen C. Daily, Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on
NaturalEcosystems (Washington: Island Press, 1997).

10.

See Herman E. Daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of SustainableDevelopment (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1996).

11.

Christian Brodhag, "From Rationality to Governance: The Decision Process of Sustainable
Development," (1999) 2 Int'l J.S.D. 388.

12.

Union of Concerned Scientists, "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity" (1992), online:
<http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/about/1992-world-scientists-warning-to-humanity.html>. See
also Andrew Light & Holmes Rolston III, eds., EnvironmentalEthics:An Anthology (Oxford:
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II. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (SRI)
A.

SRI: ITS BUSINESS AND ETHICAL MOTIVATIONS

Having evolved from its traditions of church-based, single-issue activism, the
modern era of SRI arose in the early 1970s in the wake of opposition to
corporate ties to the Vietnam War and the apartheid regime of South Africa.
SRI now spans a broad constellation of interests campaigning for socially and
environmentally responsible financing. 3 It tackles issues as diverse as animal
welfare, genetically modified organisms, climate change, and Indigenous
peoples' rights. Its proponents include pension plans interested in sustainable,
long-term investment, mutual funds selling SRI portfolios to the general public,
and banks requiring their borrowers to minimize the environmental
degradation of financed projects."'
While investors often market the language of SRI promiscuously, it has
become increasingly recognized as primarily a means to further sustainable
development.15 Yet, as with the contested sustainability discourse, the
motivations to incorporate environmental considerations in investment are
diverse. The dominant motivation is business case SRI, which seeks financial
advantage, in contrast to a smaller strand of ethical investment that serves
values-based investors.
Business case investors tend to scrutinize social, environmental, and
corporate governance issues as factors that may affect the financial condition of
companies. Such factors garner attention when considered to be financially
"material." 6 Materiality implies significant financial risks or investment
Blackwell, 2003); Colin L. Soskolne, ed., Sustaining Life on Earth (New York: Lexington
Books, 2007).
13.

Russell Sparkes, "A Historikal Perspective on the Growth of Socially Responsible
Investment," in R. Sullivan & C. Mackenzie, eds., Responsible Investment (Sheffield:
Greenleaf, 2006) 39.

14.

See Marcel Jeucken, SustainableFinanceand Banking: The FinancialSector and the Futureof
the Planet(London: Earthscan, 2001); Sonia Labatt & Rodney R. White, Environmental
Finance:A Guide to EnvironmentalRisk Assessment and FinancialProducts(New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 2002).

15.

For an early perspective, see Susan Meeker-Lowry, Economicsas if the Earth Really Mattered:
A Catalyst Guide to Socially Conscious Investing (Gabriola Island: New Society, 1988).

16.

United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), The MaterialityofSocia
Environmentaland CorporateGovernanceIssues in Equity Pricing(Geneva: UNEPFI, 2004).

250

120081 46 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

opportunities. The United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative
(UNEPFI), which is a voluntary program coordinated by the UN to promote
SRI, explains in its report, Show Me the Money, that "[t]he first-and arguably
for investors the most important-reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to
make more money. " " In another UNEPFI report, financial analysts are
cautioned to "[c]ommunicate on issue-specific, proven, quantifiable, material
links to business value ...[and to] avoid moral arguments.' 18 Business case SRI
is typically implemented through light-touch screens which filter only the most
pernicious companies from an investment portfolio (because of a perceived
financial advantage), through polite engagement with corporate management,
and through technical analyses to reveal financial risks and profitable
opportunities inhering in corporate social and environmental behaviour.
Business case SRI considers social and environmental issues in imperfect
ways. Unless they have tangible financial implications, ethical issues may be
ignored. Often they are perceived as too nebulous for workable financial
quantification. 9 Sometimes "reputational risks" associated with unethical
environmental or social practices may be of sufficient consequence to financiers
to garner attention. Given that somewhere between fifty to seventy per cent of
large companies' economic value is intangible, including their brand name and
2
goodwill, risk to their business reputation can induce more ethical behaviour. "
A poor reputation can affect the value of a firm's shares, as well as its ability to
attract and retain a higher quality workforce. A pioneering report by the World
Resources Institute (WRI) argues that the poor and marginalized can benefit
from the business case approach in cases where financiers find that their
projects need community consent and legitimacy.2' Nonetheless, reputational

17. UNEPFI, Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Socialand Governance Issues to
Company Value (Geneva: UNEPFI, 2006) at 4.
18. UNEPFI, Generation Lost: Young FinancialAnalysts and Environmental,Social and
Governance Issues (Geneva: UNEPFI, 2004) at 5 [Executive Summary].
19.

Environment Canada, Financeand the Environment in North America: The State ofPlay of the
Integration ofEnvironmentalIssues into FinancialResearch by Sue McGeachie, Matthew
Kiernan & Eric Kirzner (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Services Canada, 2005) at 57.

20.

Dr. Noel Purcell, (Address delivered at the UNEPFI Global Roundtable, Melbourne, 24-25
October 2007).

21.

Steven Herz, Antoni laVina & Jonathan Sohn, Development without Conflict. The Business
Casefor Community Consent (Washington: World Resources Institute, 2007).
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risk to financiers is not an echo for all underlying societal concerns, as
sometimes the most disadvantaged groups and victims of environmental
hardship lack the means to publicize their plight.
A further basis for business case SRI is said to rest on the role of
institutional investors as "universal owners." In The Rise ofFiduciary Capitalism,
Hawley and Williams herald institutional investors such as large pension funds
and insurance companies as a new force for corporate responsibility.22 The
growth of large and diverse institutional investment holdings has, they believe,
spawned the conditions for a new kind of responsible investment. Hawley and
Williams contend that universal owners with broad stock portfolios in many
economic sectors have an interest in the health and long-term sustainability of
the entire economy. By contrast, an investor in just one company or one
market will not be as broadly focused and will presumably care only about the
financial performance of that narrow interest and not necessarily about the
costs it may impose on others.
These assumptions are debatable. It is certainly unlikely that "universal"
institutional investors can coordinate their investments to keep economic
growth within fundamental ecological limits.23 The financial market contains
no inherent mechanism to keep the size of the economy within natural limits,
such as by restraining pollution within the assimilative capacity of the
environment. In the absence of regulatory restraints, such as a legislative cap on
the economy's greenhouse gas emissions, universal investors face steep hurdles
in working collectively to moderate economic growth imperatives. Further, they
commonly act through intermediaries such as hired fund managers, creating
additional barriers to investing sustainably. The fund managers' system of
remuneration, based on short-term performance and coupled with short-term
contracts, encourages myopic investment decision making.2"
The main alternative style of SRI is principally a matter of ethical
compulsion.25 Generally, there are two ethical approaches evident in this type of

22.

James Hawley & Andrew Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).

23.

Herman E. Daly, Toward a Steady-State Economy (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1973).

24.

See Tony Golding, The City: Inside the Great Expectation Machine (London: Financial Times
and Prentice Hall, 2002).

25.

Alice Marlin, "Social Investing: Potent Force for Political Change" (1986) Bus. Soc'y Rev. 96.
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SRI. It has traditionally been based on deontological ethics, involving investors
who do not wish to profit from unethical activities, such as gambling or
pornography. This approach focuses on the supposed rightness or wrongness of
an activity. The dominant form of ethical investment today is associated with
teleological ethics, which focuses on the consequences of a particular action.
This style of ethical investment is promoted in order to leverage change in the
environmental or social behaviour of companies. Such an ethical approach does
not ignore the financial "bottom line," yet it diverges from business case SRI by
insisting on the consideration of ethical issues for their own sake, and not
only for financial benefit. It presumes that an individual or organization
remains moral when faced with any decision, including financial
26
management: there is no dichotomy.
Religious institutions pioneered ethical investment. 27 They addressed social
and environmental concerns not for their financial advantages, but for the moral
desire and commission to improve the world. The churches used their financial
muscle to campaign against apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s, contributing
to the regime's eventual demise. The South African divestment campaign was not
motivated by a desire to reap greater profits, but rather, morally, it was perceived
as the right course of action. Today, some faith-based investors again champion
SRI, such as the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility's campaigns for
climate change and environmental justice.2 8 Ethically motivated investors are also
found to some extent in the credit union sector, such as in Canada's Vancouver
City Savings Credit Union; in the banking sector, such as the Cooperative Bank
(Britain) and Umweltbank (Germany);29 in public sector pension fnds, notably
the UK's Universities Superannuation Scheme; 30 and in some mutual funds that

26.

Wesley Cragg, "Business Ethics and Stakeholder Theory" (2002) 12 Bus. Ethics Q. 113.

27.

Niklas Kreander, Ken McPhail & David Molyneaux, "God's Fund Managers: A Critical
Study of Stock Market Investment Practices of the Church of England and UK Methodists"
(2004) 17 AAAJ 408; Paola Triolo, Martin Palmer & Steve Waygood, A CapitalSolution:
Faith, Financeand Concernfrra Living Planet (London: Pilkington Press, 2000) at 26-53.

28.

See Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility, "Global Warming, Working Groups,"
online: <http://www.iccr.orglissues/globalwarm/goalsobjectives.php>.

29.

See The Co-Operative Bank, online: <http://www.co-operativebank.co.uk>; UmweltBank,
online: <http://www.umweltbank.de>.

30.

See VanCity, online: <http://www.vancity.com>; Universities Superannuation Scheme,
online: <http://www.usslq.co.uk>.
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offer dedicated, ethically screened portfolios, such as Domini Social
Investments (United States). 3
Neither business nor ethical compulsions have so far proved adequate to
make SRI dominant in the market. The ethical approach is too controversial for
most investment institutions, which fear financial losses or unresolvable
disputes over the correct ethical course. The business case, while potentially
more appealing, cannot work widely because most social and environmental
issues defy easy measurement in financial terms, or simply because there
remains a compelling countervailing business case for continued
environmentally unsustainable practices.
Thus, because of these reasons, the SRI sector appears to hold below 10 or
5 per cent of the capital markets of major economies. Further, much of the
finance nominally counted as SRI hardly contributes to sustainable
development. In the US market, the Social Investment Forum (SIF) reported in
2007 that US$2.71 trillion or "[a]bout one out of every eleven dollars under
professional management ... is involved in socially responsible investing."32 The
European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif) reported in its 2006 survey that
SRI in western Europe was worth between E105 billion (based on core SRI
screens) and E1,033 trillion (incorporating further the value of shareholder
activism and engagement).33 The latter, larger figure was the equivalent of
between 10 to 15 per cent of managed assets in European funds.34 A survey of
the Canadian SRI sector, conducted in 2006 by the Social
Investment
Organization (SIO), found Canadian SRI of CAD$503 billion, amounting to
nearly 20 per cent of that market.3"
Discrepancies between these jurisdictions likely reflect different surveying
methodologies rather than significant underlying differences in investors'
interest in SRI, although some differences exist The US study relied on very
broad standards for measuring what constitutes SRI, and counted funds that
31.

Domini Social Investments (DSI), Global Investment Standards (Boston: DSI, 2006).

32. Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the
United States (Washington: SIF, March 2008) at ii.
33. Eurosif, Socially Responsible Investment among EuropeanInstitutionalInvestors (Paris: Eurosif,
2006) at 4-5.
34.

Ibid. at 13.

35.

Social Investment Organization (SIO), CanadianSocial Investment Review 2006(Toronto:
SIO, 2007) at 5-6.

254

(2008) 46 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

screen out investments involved in only one issue, such as tobacco or gambling.
Indeed, 25 per cent of nominally SRI funds screened out investments on the
basis of only one of these criteria.3 6 The Canadian study included SRI where the
fund self-declared in a questionnaire that it follows certain shareholder
engagement and voting practices to influence corporate management. The
Canada Pension Plan (CPP), whose investment portfolio was accepted by the
survey as "SRI," in fact only engages with up to fifteen companies per year of
the nearly two thousand in its portfolio.37 Moreover, some of its investments
remain in companies of dubious social and environmental records, such as the
mining behemoth Goldcorp, which was a assigned.a grade of D+ in a recent
38
Globe andMail survey of corporate social responsibility.
Because the SRI market is likely to be much smaller than these surveys
suggest, its capacity to leverage change by raising the cost of finance for
polluters or pressuring for change through shareholder activism has been rather
limited. Regulatory and public policy changes are therefore probably essential
to improve the quality and extent of SRI.
B.

SRI GOVERNANCE

The dominance of the business case in the SRI movement not only reflects the
power of economic fundamentals in a competitive market, but also
demonstrates how financial institutions view their legal obligations and their
accountability solely for their financial performance.
Legal reforms worldwide to promote SRI have quickened in recent years,
though overall they remain rather modest and ad hoc, and have hardly touched
fiduciary investment standards. They range from measures to regulate
substantive investment criteria to procedural changes that tinker with
investment decision processes. So far, the latter has been the dominant style of
SRI regulation, and it has yet to demonstrate a significant impact. Worldwide,
there is little appetite for anything approaching a command economy,
36. Supra note 32.
37.

Donald Raymond, "Mainstreaming Responsible Investment: Our Approach" (Presentation
delivered on behalf of the CPP Investment Board at Globe 2006, Vancouver, 30 March
2006), online: CPP Investment Board <http://www.cppib.ca/files/PDFspeeches/20060330_DR_ Globe.pdf>.

38.

"CSR Mining" The Globe andMail (22 February 2007), online: <http://www.theglobeand
maii.comlservletlstory/RTGAM.20070222.rmcsrming/BNStory/specialROBmagazine/>.
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stigmatized by the socialist experiment of Eastern Europe. Under the sway of
neo-liberal thinking, lightly regulated financial markets are viewed by policymakers as more efficient and conducive to economic growth. 9 Governments
have thus mostly confined themselves to broad oversight and prudential
regulation, intervening aggressively only in cases of market crises."
Reforms to promote SRI have been adopted at both national and
international levels, although in the latter sphere they tend to set only
voluntary, aspirational standards. 1 Consistent with general governance trends
away from command-and-control regulation, SRI policy reforms have tended
to emphasize market-based and informational tools that alter the procedures
and processes of SRI decision making. Such standards do not require additional
societal agreement concerning what is "ethical" or "socially responsible."
Rather, they shape the way investments are chosen and implemented, providing
for greater transparency and accountability, and thereby serve to apply pressure
on laggards to change and market rewards for leaders. By modifying how
financiers view the environmental and social repercussions of their actions,
process standards may stimulate changes in social values that contribute to
sustainability." Process-oriented legal scholarship and deliberative approaches
to democracy both emphasize the potential of such procedures for engineering
changes in values. 3 Participation in environmental decision making has been
linked to the cultivation of deeper, ethical concerns for nature." Reflexive law
theorists also contend that encouraging companies to reflect and learn about
39.

Edward S. Shaw, FinancialDeepening in Economic Development (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973); Ajit Singh, "Financial Liberalisation, Stockmarkets and Economic
Development" (1997) 107 Econ. J. 771.

40.

W.A. Lee, "Modern Portfolio Theory and the Investment of Pension Funds," in P.D. Finn, ed.,
Equity and CommercialRelationships (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1987) 284 at 314-15
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As a rule in the law
of trusts a settlor may dispose of benefits as he thinks fit, since he has furnished the fund").

41.
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Socially Responsible Investment" in Ole Kristian Fauchald & David Hunter, eds., Yearbook
of InternationalEnvironmentalLaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 73.
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their ecological impacts may sometimes exert greater long-term influence than
regulating firms through coercion or rewards."
Among the policy instruments. currently available are requirements for
investment institutions to disclose their policies for addressing social and
environmental issues, as well as their policies for exercising shareholder proxy
votes. The most prominent transparency reforms were introduced in the UK,
several other European states, and Australia, obliging occupational pension funds
or other types of funds to disclose their SRI policies, if any." Another reform,
adopted in Canada and the US, requires mutual funds to disclose their shareholder
proxy voting policies and voting records.4" Prominent voluntary standards used in
the SRI industry include the Eurosif Transparency Guidelines," the Global
Reporting Initiative, 9 and the Carbon Disclosure Project.5"
Research on the implementation of some of these standards reveals
shortcomings." In practice, mandated disclosures often entail vague, boilerplate
statements that reveal little about the methodology behind SRI decisions or
their implementation. 2 Process standards have rarely extended to democratizing
investment policy-making, which remains dominated by fund managers,
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EcologicalResponsibility: The Concept andPracticeof EcologicalSelf-Organization (Chichester:
John Wiley & Sons, 1994).

46.
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2005/3378, ss. 2(3)(b)(vi)-(3)(c); Australia's CorporationsAct 2001 (Cth.), s. 1013D(1)(1);
and France's Loi n 2001-152 du 19fivrier 2001 sur lipargnesalariale,J.0., 20 February
2001, 2774, arts. 21, 23.

47.
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Investment Fund ContinuousDisclosureand Companion Policy, O.S.C. NI 81-106 and NI 81106CP (11 March 2005).
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Guidelines (Paris: Eurosif, 2004).
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investment analysts, and other experts. Transparency regulation gives financiers
the option of choosing not to take social, environmental, and other ethical
matters into account, provided that they disclose that decision.
Another type of SRI governance that is less evident sets normative
standards, which provide substantive principles and guidance toward desirable
performance. One example is the UN Principles of Responsible Investment
(UNPRI) of 2006, a concise document of six core principles, each of which is
illustrated by several "possible actions." 3 For instance, the first principle states
that signatories "will incorporate environmental, social and corporate
governance (ESG) issues into investment analysis and decision-making
processes." These principles are heavily subscribed to, but largely because of
their voluntary nature and the lack of substantial changes expected of
signatories. The UNPRI do not require a signatory to demonstrate any specific
SRI performance standards with regard to human rights or environmental
protection. They also lack compliance machinery 'and signatories are not
obliged to report publicly on their performance. Another voluntary standard is
the Equator Principles, which address the banking sector and projects it
finances.5" They contain stronger environmental assessment and process
standards than the UNPRI, although implementation appears to have lagged
and some banks remain mired in environmentally controversial projects.5
Among official regulations, mandatory SRI standards are rare. Some
governments have banned specific undesirable investments, as an adjunct to
primary controls. One illustration is Belgium's prohibition on investments in
companies that produce or distribute cluster bombs.56 Another example is the
bans instituted by some US states on pension fund investments in Sudan,
which is presently associated with extensive human rights atrocities.57
Obligations to actively promote SRI appear confined to public pension funds,
53. The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), online <http://www.unpri.org/principles>.
54. The Equator Principles, online: <http://www.equator-principles.com>.
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with reforms adopted in France, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden. For
example, Sweden's National Pension Insurance Funds (AP-Funds)Act of 20008
requires state pension funds to take "environmental and social considerations
... into account without relinquishing the overall goal of a high return on
capital."59 While the applicable legislation does not differentiate between
specific investment choices, the funds are guided by an ethics council. Referring
to internationally recognized standards for human rights and sustainable
development as their benchmarks, the ethics council can flexibly accommodate
case-by-case evaluations of specific investments and thereby abjure an ethics
that "become[s] standardised and reduced to a few abstruse ratios." 6" In 2007,
the UNEPFI's detailed survey of the Swedish and other public sector funds
"highlight[ed] a range of some of the most advanced and creative approaches to
61
responsible investment.
Among other policy instruments applied to financial markets are economic
incentives (e.g., green investment tax concessions in the Netherlands), corporate
governance reforms that enable greater shareholder advocacy (e.g., in Australia
and Canada), and environmental liability on lenders for pollution problems
connected to their borrowers (e.g., in the US).62 However, their track record in
boosting SRI is patchy, and in the case of environmental liability for lenders in
the US, the rules were changed to protect lenders after a deluge of lawsuits.63
Conversely, popular mechanisms such as the Dutch taxation concessions are
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appealing precisely because they reward positive behaviour rather than penalize
harmful conduct."
In sum, the progression of the SRI market, and its governance, remains
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The mostly market-friendly styles of
governance do not appear to have been any more effective than traditional
forms of environmental law based on command-and-control regulation. Indeed,
the paucity of such regulation, such as the lack of caps on greenhouse gas
emissions, has directly hindered action by progressive-minded financiers who
would likely take climate change more seriously if governments rigorously taxed
or restricted carbon emissions. The responsibility for upholding the integrity of
the voluntary mechanisms has largely fallen on nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) such as BankTrack, which scrutinize the behaviour of financial
institutions against the standards they pledge to follow. A vast legal terrain for
strengthening SRI for sustainable development remains under-explored.
III. ETHICS FOR ETHICAL INVESTMENT
A.

BUILDING AN ETHICAL CONSENSUS

An ethical approach to SRI raises questions about the fundamental qualities of
the human character, our ability to cultivate new ethical values, and the
capacity of our institutions to give effect to those values. Some people refute the
very possibility of ethical change, interpreting social values as reflective of
intrinsic, fixed characteristics of human nature.6" Others see human behaviour
as dynamic and motivated by many factors beyond narrow materialistic wants."
Hauser argues in Moral Minds that individuals are endowed with a moral
faculty that conveys judgments of right and wrong based on unconsciously
operative, principles of action.67 Drawing on Chomsky's theory of generative
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grammar,68 Hauser contends that all humans possess a universal moral
grammar, hard-wired into the brain. While Hauser does not specifically
discuss environmental ethics, major changes in ethical values are not
unprecedented in history, such as the abolition of slavery and the rising status
of women in many countries.
A similar major ethical shift has not yet occurred in the financial sector.
The diversity of approaches to SRI partly reflects investors' different values
regarding the relative importance of social, environmental, and economic
considerations.69 Hylton indicts a "persistent inability on the part of all
participants in the debate to develop a simple, coherent definition" of SRI.7"
Even where responsible investors share specific goals, they may differ on how
to achieve them.71 For example, during the anti-apartheid campaign, social
investors disagreed on.whether to divest entirely, or to retain financial ties
and seek change through dialogue and tactical pressure. In today's
postmodern world of ethnic and cultural diversity, concepts such as
"sustainable development" or "corporate responsibility" may be read
differently, depending on the actors and their situation.72 Thus, when the
Irish Parliament in 2006 decided to reject a legislative amendment to require
the National Pensions Reserve Fund to invest ethically, one parliamentarian
offered this reasoning:
A major difficulty in deciding on ethical investment policy is where to draw the line
in defining the parameters of the policy, given that there will inevitably be different
opinions and intense debate on what constitutes ethical and socially responsible
investment ... . Furthermore, the list of what might be considered unacceptable
investment is likely
to change in light of developments in the political, social and
73
scientific spheres.
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Nor can investors simply set their moral compass by the law of the land, as
legal rules may reflect the power of vested interests and, in a world of global
finance, the legal standards of one jurisdiction may not be compatible with
another. Thus, an economic activity that is ostensibly "legal" may not
necessarily be appropriate for ethical investment. The tobacco industry is a
classic example.
Ethical investment certainly spans a potpourri of philosophies, ranging
from evangelical Christianity to. animal liberation, but ecological ethics
represents a specific kind of ethical investment. Ecological ethics, as the
following section explains, stands a stronger chance of eventually securing a
broad social consensus that even economic actors may embrace because they are
rooted in the reality of a looming planetary crisis. We must distinguish between
a system of ethical investment based on ecological ethics that addresses
pervasive threats to the biosphere, humans included, and other ethical positions
in the investment community that reflect preferences regarding gambling,
pornography,-alcohol, and other traditional concerns of SRI.
Even granted a national or international societal consensus on SRI norms,
considerable obstacles to the ability of these norms to shape economic
behaviour remain. Luhmann theorizes how the economy tends to be
functionally differentiated and semi-autonomous from other domains of
society." With money as its lingua franca, the economic system has forged its
own values and goals around competition, acquisition, growth, and
profitability. The cost-benefit approach is central to economic management,
and ethical norms not congruent with that framework may have little influence.
Considerations such as biodiversity conservation or human rights which are not
factored in the values of the market tend to lack traction. The dominance of
business case SRI precisely illustrates the barriers to incorporating noneconomic factors into investment analysis.
Conceivably, individual actors may be.guided by values that differ from the
prevailing norms of the economy." Luhmann's framework itself distinguishes
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between social systems (the economy, legal system, et cetera) locked in their
idiosyncratic logic, and human agents and organizations. 76 Investors may comingle values from other spheres of life. Ethical investment by churches shows
how one group's participation in the economy is guided by values from beyond
the market. Abundant other evidence of ethical motivations in the marketplace
exists, including consumers who pay a premium for green products and workers
who accept lower wages for altruistic employment or refuse to work for
unethical firms.77 Such values, however, are unlikely to become widespread
without altering the regulatory framework of financial markets.
B.

ECOLOGICAL ETHICS FOR SRI

What kind of ethics could support a system of financial investment that values
the environment and respects ecological constraints? The financial world
generally treats nature instrumentally as a resource for short-term gain, owing
no direct accountability to environmental law standards that are considered
only an operational matter for the companies they invest in. The financial
sector's values reflect.a wider anthropocentric worldview in Western societies
that restricts moral significance to human beings.78 In a statement on
unsustainable patterns of resource use, the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) explained that "It]he value systems reflected in these patterns are
among the main driving forces which determine the use of natural resources.
Although the changes required for converting societies to sustainable
consumption and production patterns are not easy to implement, the shift is
imperative."79 An ethic that values all life, mirrored by legal reform, would
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broaden the scope of corporate responsibility to include the interests of a wider
group beyond investors and their financial returns.
A mature discourse on ecological ethics has . evolved, which some
environmental lawyers such as Taylor and Bosselmann champion for providing
the only enduring path to sustainability." This discourse focuses on broadening
moral consideration for all living creatures and their ecosystems.81 Such
ecological ethics emphasize the ecological reality of humankind as an integral
and interdependent part of the "web of life." 82 A cognate aspect of this ethic
recognizes the sanctity of all life forms for their "intrinsic value," regardless of
their contribution to human needs and wants.83 Ecological ethics already feature
to some extent in the culture of some Indigenous communities." That
perspective does not deny humans entitlement to use other forms of life because
it "is a condition of our existence as participants in the evolutionary process.""
Yet, while these values neither refute nor prioritize human needs, they do
enable humankind to see beyond its exclusive needs. Maintaining ecological
integrity requires that humankind learn to live more simply, so that other life
may simply live. Dependent on the biosphere as all other species are,
humankind has no choice.
While ecological ethics is a deeply rooted tree, not a reed, it still leaves
room for debate about how best to further its norms. Ecological ethics may not
offer solutions in specific situations entailing "hard choices." Thus, how does
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one reconcile legitimate human economic wants in the short term with the
need to protect the biosphere from irreparable depletion over the long term?
The sustainable development discourse also seeks to address this fundamental
question. Yet it often does so, in practice, through principles and techniques
that in fact have tended to perpetuate business as usual. By contrast, ecological
ethics seeks to open up issues of value that would otherwise be closed under an
exclusively anthropocentric perspective to sustainable development.
It is unlikely that moral exhortations will have any greater effect in
changing financiers' environmental behaviour unless they become crystallized
and protected in legal institutions as formal standards and procedures. These
range from setting substantive standards that enshrine basic ecological values to
restructuring decision-making processes to deal with local and specific
applications. Legal structures for ethical deliberation, instrumental to education
and motivating action, are one example.
Ethical investment will have no lasting impression on the financial sector if
investors regard it simply as academic wisdom or rigid regulatory prescription.
Opening investment institutions to participatory, ethical deliberation may help
attenuate such attitudes.86 In some jurisdictions, pension fund governance is
being reformed to give employees more voice in investment policies. 7 Such
mechanisms may reduce the possibility that the ethics of SRI will only reflect
the views of the powerful, without sufficient introspection to debate the moral
merits of its current habits and practices.
Various peremptory principles that have evolved through international
negotiation may help frame and unify such ethical deliberations. The Earth
Charter, for instance, evokes the kind of universal principles compatible with
ethically framed SRI.88 The Charter was adopted in 2002 following lengthy
consultation, mainly held among NGOs, and drew inspiration from the UN's
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1982 World Charter for Nature." It comprises a series of core principles and
supporting principles, the most relevant for the business sector being the following:
6. Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection and, when
knowledge is limited, apply a precautionary approach.
7. Adopt patterns of production, consumption, and reproduction that safeguard
Earth's regenerative capacities, human rights, and community well-being.

10. Ensure that economic activities and institutions
at all levels promote human
90
development in an equitable and sustainable manner.

Still, the Earth Charter is not tailored to the financial sector, and many of
its provisions are cast much too broadly. The Earth Charter International
Council's "Business Initiative" is trying to increase its appeal to this group,
explaining that "[t]he challenge is how to break out of the current 'business-asusual' model, while maintaining the best of the private sector's entrepreneurial,
technological and financial skills and innovative capacity."'" So far,
approximately 180 business organizations worldwide have endorsed the
Charter, out of some 3,000 endorsements.
The Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions, drafted in 2003 by
a coalition of NGOs, is possibly the most useful ethically related code for SRI.92
Unlike the Earth Charter, the Collevecchio Declaration sets ethical standards
specifically for financial markets. It requires a commitment to six core
principles: sustainability, "do no harm," responsibility, accountability,
transparency, and the creation of sustainable markets and governance. The
accompanying implementation guide outlines immediate steps that financial
institutions should take.
Apart from the Californian pension fund giant CaPERS, financiers have
largely shunned the Declaration.93 Most of the 100 signatories are NGOs.94
89.
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Financiers likely perceive it as an abrasive, ideologically driven NGO initiative,
with rigorous requirements too exacting for the financial sector. For instance,
the ambitious "commitment to sustainability" principle obliges signatories to
"fully integrate the consideration of ecological limits [and] social equity ... into
corporate strategies and core business areas (including credit, investing,
underwriting, advising), to put sustainability objectives on an equal footing to
shareholder maximization and client satisfaction ... ."" Further, the
Declaration's "do no harm" principle entails categorical prohibitions for the
most socially and environmentally egregious transactions. It also seeks to
strengthen financiers' accountability and transparency, expecting them to be
"responsive to stakeholder needs for specialised information" and holding that
"commercial confidentiality should not be used as an excuse to deny
stakeholders information.""
The financial sector's disavowal of such demanding principles suggests that
an ethical framework must be based on more than a voluntary code, although
its standards should certainly be formulated with input from applicable
institutions. The contrasting success of the voluntary UNPRI, with over 250
signatories in the financial sector with assets of over US$10 trillion as of early
2008, 9' is not necessarily a model either, as its standards are too facile with little
public accountability.
How, then, can ethical imperatives attain stronger legal expression to guide
SRI? Refraining the fiduciary duties of investment decision makers offers one
crucial direction for environmental law reform, which is the focus of the
remainder of this article.
IV. REGULATORY REFORMS FOR ETHICAL INVESTMENT
A.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Long-established legal principles govern financial institutions' management of
the capital of their investors. While individuals may invest directly in the
market, in recent decades the vast majority of investors use the services of a
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financial intermediary, such as a mutual fund or pension plan.98 In the UK, for
example, the proportion of all corporate shares held by individuals fell from 54
per cent in 1963 to below 13 per cent in 2006."9 Where financial institutions
manage the capital of others, the legal system often imposes fiduciary standards
on them to invest carefully in the interests of their beneficiaries and in
accordance with the purpose of the particular fund."' Although very
occasionally individual investors can be effective catalysts for change, such as
Ralph Nader in the US or Yves Michaud in Canada, the following focus on
financial intermediaries and their fiduciary duties is wholly justified given their
massive resources and market influence.
Institutional investors have generally dismissed calls that they should
choose investments on ethical grounds, contending that, as their fund members
likely hold diverse ethical views on social and environmental issues, it would be
impossible to achieve a consensus of values to guide financial decision making.
Alternatively, the maximization of financial returns is considered a clear and
easily measurable benchmark to which fund managers should be held
accountable. This stance relegates ethics to a matter of subjective, personal
taste, compared to the supposed hard objectivity of financial returns.
Consequently, ethics is not understood as including fundamental principles for
addressing the challenges of sustainability.
The impact of fiduciary standards on SRI was first appreciated in the
1980s during the South African divestment campaign.1'5 Today, lawyers and
financial experts debate whether fiduciary duties can support a much wider
sustainability agenda. The World Economic Forum has recommended that
governments "[m]odify pension fiduciary rules which discourage or prohibit
explicit trustee consideration of social and environmental aspects of corporate

98.
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performance."1 °2 Conversely, a report commissioned by UNEPFI suggested that
"integrating [SRI] considerations into an investment analysis so as to more
reliably predict financial performance is clearly permissible and is arguably
required in all jurisdictions."" 3 Some legal commentators go so far as to assert
that "[i]nstitutional investors could face negligence claims unless the investors
take account of environmental, social and corporate governance when making
decisions."' 4 Such upbeat conclusions, however, appear to assume SRI
governed by business case criteria.
In generic terms, a fiduciary relationship is a bond of responsibility and
dependency.0 ' It typically arises where the exercise of some discretionary power
in the interests of another person gives rise to a relationship of trust. The
"trust" is a concept of English law by which specific assets are held and
managed by the trustee (i.e., the fiduciary) in the interests of the beneficiary.0 6
Functionally similar legal arrangements in financial regulation often exist in
many non-common law jurisdictions. Consequential to the powers provided,
fiduciaries must act in the beneficiary's interests, and not their own. Thus, the
fiduciary's foremost duty is to act in the sole or best interests of the beneficiary
(the duty of loyalty). 0 ' Further, the fiduciary has a duty of competence,
requiring skill and diligence, usually expressed in the context of investment
management as the "prudent investor rule."1 8 Depending on the jurisdiction,
the sources of these legal duties come from the common law, legislation, and

102. World Economic Forum (WEF), MainstreamingResponsible Investment (Geneva: WEF,
2005) at 10.
103. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, A Legal Frameworkfor the Integration of EnvironmentaL Social
and GovernanceIssues into InstitutionalInvestment (Geneva: UNEPFI, October 2005) at 13.
104. Leon Gettler, "Big funds warned on negligence," The Age (30 November 2005),
(commenting on the Freshfields report).
105. See generally J.C. Shepherd, "Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships"
(1981) 97 L.Q. Rev. 51.
106. See David Hayton, "The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship," in A.J. Oakley, ed.,
Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 47; Alastair Hudson,
Principlesof Equity and Trusts (London: Cavendish, 1999).
107. John Langbein, "Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?"
(2005) 114 Yale L.J. 929.
108. See generally B. Longstreth, Modern Investment Management andthe PrudentMan Rule (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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specific instruments governing investment entities (e.g., a pension plan's
founding agreement).
Fiduciary responsibilities materialize in different ways across the financial
sector. They apply particularly to occupational pension funds structured as
trusts. Commercial banks do not normallyowe their depositors a fiduciary duty
and may use deposited money as they see fit within the parameters of banking
regulation. Although fiduciary principles operate in mutual fund governance
requiring managers to further the specific purpose of the fund, contractual
techniques and. disclosure-based regulation are primarily used for aligning
investment decisions with the interests of fund members.
Fiduciary standards in these contexts are often understood to require
prioritizing financial goals over all other concerns. However, conceptually, a
"benefit" to beneficiaries need not be limited to a financial benefit. If
beneficiaries share a moral objection to a particular form of investment, they
may psychologically benefit if their fund avoids that investment, possibly even
at the cost of a lower financial return." 9 In one US case, the court viewed the
fiduciary relationship as requiring the trustees to safeguard "unique scenic,
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic value
on the open market."110 Even where the purpose of the trust is construed as
only to provide financial benefits, some courts have interpreted the duty of
loyalty as only to seek a reasonable rate of return rather than to maximize
financial returns. A judge in one British case stated, "I cannot conceive that
trustees have an unqualified duty ... simply to invest trust funds in the most
profitable investment available." 1. Consequently, fiduciaries may further
collateral social and environmental goals so long as financial returns are not
unreasonably compromised.
Indeed, given evidence that SRI funds achieve financial returns
commensurate to other investment institutions,112 SRI can arguably constitute a
109. Paul Palmer et al., Socially Responsible Investment: A Guidefor PensionSchemes and Charities
(London: Haven, 2005) at 97.
110. VationalParks and ConservationAuthority v. Boardof State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 at 921
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1993).
111. Martin v. City ofEdinburgh DistrictCouncil, 11988] SCLR 90, S.L.R. 329 at 334 (Scot.) (per
Lord Murray).
112. See UNEPFI Asset Management Working Group & Mercer, Demystifying Responsible
Investment Performance:A Review ofKey Academic andBroker Research on ESG Factors
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prudent financial choice.113 Some social and environmental risks may ultimately
affect shareholder value, due to possible costly consequences such as litigation,
regulatory actions, and consumer backlash." Some ecological and human
rights issues have become so pervasive and serious that few investors can ignore
their impact. Climate change is an emerging example of interest to business case
SRI actors."
Other factors affect the relationship between fiduciary standards and SRI.
The specific methods of SRI are relevant. Strict ethical investment screens that
exclude large portions of the market reduce the diversity of assets in an
investment portfolio, which economists predict will increase the risk of lower
returns. 6 This would run afoul of fiduciary duties.1 Other SRI strategies may
be congruent with prudent investment standards. Best-of-class methods,
selecting the most socially responsible firms in each particular economic sector,
should allow for retention of an adequately diversified portfolio. Further,
shareholder advocacy, where investors seek to influence companies from within
through shareholder resolutions and other tactics, should contribute to the
fulfillment of- fiduciary responsibilities.1 8 Finally, the applicable legal
instrument constituting the fund is often the foremost authority in governing a
fiduciary's duties and investment decisions.119 This reflects another aspect of the
duty of loyalty. If the trust deed of a pension plan or mutual fund expressly

(Geneva: UNEPFI, 2007). One possible reason why SRI funds tend not to under-perform is
that many do not hold investment portfolios significantly different from the market generally.
113. See Sonia Labatt & Rodney White, EnvironmentalFinance:A Guide to EnvironmentalRisk
Assessment andFinancialProducts (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2002) at 151-55.
114. See e.g. Sandra Waddock & Samuel Graves, "The Corporate Social Performance Financial
Performance Link" (1997) 184 Strategic Mgmt. J. 303; David Edwards, The Link Between
Company Environmentaland FinancialPerformance (London: Earthscan, 1998).
115. Mercer Investment Consulting, A Climatefor Change: A Trustee's Guide to Understanding
andAddressing Climate Risk (Toronto: Mercer Investment Consulting, 2005).
116. Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection" (1952) 7 J.Fin. 77.
117. Robin Ellison, "The Golden Fleece? Ethical Investment and Fiduciary Law" (1991) 5:4
Trust L. Int'l 157.
118. Paul Myners, InstitutionalInvestment in the UnitedKingdom: A Review (London: HM
Treasury, 2001) at 92.
119. See McCreightv. 146919 Canada Ltd, [19911 O.J. No. 136 (QL) (Ont. Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)).
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requires social investment to further a specified mission, then the fiduciary
12
must fulfill those criteria unless legislation dictates otherwise. 1
Courts have ruled on some of these considerations. In the UK, the country
with the richest SRI case law, the fiduciary responsibilities of trustees were
considered in Cowan v. Scargill,'2 Martin v. City of Edinburgh District
Council,122 and Harries and others v. Church Commissioners for England.123 In

Cowan, the most publicized case, Vice-Chancellor Robert Megarry disagreed
with the SRI policy of the. union-nominated trustees, holding that where the
trust's purpose is to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries, their best
interests normally meant their financial interests. 12' Trustees could consider
non-financial criteria in constructing such a portfolio, provided such alternative
investments were equally beneficial to the beneficiaries. The most noteworthy
US case on the legality of SRI is the Board of Trustees of Employee Retirement
System of the City of Baltimore v. City ofBaltimore.125 It dealt with a public sector
pension plan directed under the City's ordinances to divest from companies
engaged in business in South Africa. In a challenge to the legality of these
provisions of the ordinances, the court cautiously endorsed the SRI policies,
ruling that "if ...
social investment yields economically competitive returns at a
26
comparable level of risk, the investment should not be deemed imprudent.'
Despite such legal skirmishes, which are now rather dated, SRI has become
increasingly less controversial to the market precisely because it hardly
challenges the economic values that underpin fiduciary norms. The SRI market
presently sits quite comfortably with the prevailing legal norms because it often
represents business as usual. The composition of many mutual funds' SRI
portfolios is remarkably similar to regular portfolios. A 2004 survey by the
Natural Capital Institute concluded that "the screening methodologies and
exceptions employed by most SRI funds allow practically any publicly-held

120. Pension legislation often mandates priority to financial investment returns. See e.g. US's
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 110 4 (a)(1)(D) (1974)).
121. [1985] 1 Ch. 270.
122. [19881 S.L.T. 329.
123. [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1241, [1993] 2 All E.R. 300.
124. Supra note 121.
125. 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989).
126. Ibid. at 107.
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corporation to be considered as an SRI portfolio company. " 127 For most
financiers, any interest in SRI is largely a means to manage another perceived
business risk rather than a tool for enlightened change. However, investment
policies that prioritize ethical goals over financial returns remain problematic,
except to some extent in the retail market where mutual funds can tailor ethical
investment services to the public, if there is demand. Otherwise, fiduciary
investment standards do not require consideration of social and environmental
matters. They remain discretionary considerations, to be weighted by the very
market forces that have habitually promoted unsustainable development.
B.

FIDUCIARY FINANCE

1.

ACCOUNTING FOR SUSTAINABILITY

Before canvassing possible legal formulae for recasting fiduciary duties to
support ecological ethics, the instruments for defining environmental goals and
tracking performance must be identified. The critical challenge is developing
meaningful sustainability performance benchmarks with which to clothe
fiduciary duties. A fiduciary standard will be unworkable if financial
institutions are merely accountable to vague ethical goals such as -to "promote
ecological integrity." One way to articulate a workable standard is to use the
analytical framework of "returns" that is central to the basic calculations of
financiers. Sustainability, as the goal of ecological ethics, implies that fiduciaries
must take into account the "returns" to society and the environment, in
addition to investors' private financial returns.1 28 Social accounting and
sustainability indicators provide metrics to help quantify social and
environmental returns.
Social accounting provides a way to measure the collateral benefits (e.g., job
creation, public infrastructure, and environmental protection) and collateral
costs (e.g., damage to natural resources and intensification of social inequalities)
of economic activity. 1" Social accounting differs from conventional

127. Paul Hawken, Socially Responsible Investing (Sausalito: Natural Capital Institute, 2004) at 16.
128. See Steven Lydenberg, "Universal Investors and Socially Responsible Investors: A Tale of
Emerging Affinities" (2007) 15 Corp. Governance 467.
129. Jeffrey Unerman, Jan Bebbington & Brendan O'Dwyer, eds., SustainabilityAccounting and
Accountability (New York: Routledge, 2007); Daniel Rubenstein, "Bridging the Gap
Between Green Accounting and Black Ink" (1992) 17 Acct., Org. & Soc'y 501; and Jack
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methodologies associated with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) by focusing on community and environmental impacts rather than on
factors exclusively related to corporate financial health. Similar models being'
advanced to measure economic activities in their entirety provide alternatives to
national gross domestic product (GDP) accounting that discount the costs of
natural resources exploitation. 13 Social accounting is not a means of
perpetuating business case SRI, for it focuses on quantifying social welfare
rather than merely furthering corporate business needs.
While several decades of social accounting research have helped to advance
the measurement of companies' social and ecological footprints,"' it has hardly
influenced conventional financial accounting. The GAAP measures an entity's
expenses and income associated with past, not future, market transactions.
Accounting for the disparate and often ethereal externalities of firms in a
financier's portfolio, through accounting reforms to corporate and financial
institutional reporting, would require fundamental changes to this model. So
far, social accounting has mosdy influenced the propagation of satellite,
narrative reporting schemes, such as the "management discussion and analysis
(MD&A)" sections in business financial statements.
Regardless, social accounting is not a panacea for all the problems of
unethical investment. Social accountants, like ecological economists, cannot yet
appropriately valuate all social or environmental impacts. Further, these
methods may prove controversial if predicted financial returns outweigh any
diminution in social or natural capital. As a form of "accounting," it may imply
an instrumental and exploitative cost-benefit paradigm that does not ensure the
maintenance of ecological integrity, which may sometimes be required at any
high cost. The Ford Pinto case, where managers used a cost-benefit analysis to

Quarter, Laurie Mook & Betty Richmond, What Counts: SocialAccountingfor Nonprofits and
Cooperatives (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003).
130. Robert Repetto et al., Wasting Assets: NationalResources in the NationalIncome Accounts
(Washington: World Resources Institute, 1989); Kjell Brekke, Economic Growth and the
Environment: On the Measurementof Income and Welfare (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997).
131. See Rob Gray, David Owen & Carol Adams, eds., Accountingand Accountability: Changes
and Challengesin CorporateSocial andEnvironmentalReporting (New Jersey: Prentice Hall
International, 1996); David Owen & Brendan O'Dwyer, "CSR:'The Reporting and
Assurance Dimension," in Andrew Crane etal., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Corporate
Social Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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conclude that costs of correcting a defective fuel system design on one of the
company's cars outweighed the expected litigation costs of deaths and/or
injuries, highlights the concern with reliance on instrumental economic
calculations. 3 2 Sagoff cautions that, even granting quantification of all
environmental values in monetary terms, questions of balancing environmental
values against other "goods" should be determined by public, participatory
processes, rather than by reference to people's private willingness to pay."'
The potential limitations of social accounting are reasons to consider
another tool for ethical investment, namely sustainability indicators. These
allow progress towards sustainability based on certain social, environmental,
and other markers to be tracked over time.' They can also assist decision
makers by translating ecological, economic, and social data into performance
standards, and warning of impending problems. While sustainability indicators
can be just as methodologically complex to determine as social accounting
metrics, they do not require financial quantification per se. And they do not
dictate how underlying performance standards be met. With further
refinement, they even could replace shareholder value as the dominant measure
of corporate wealth.
Sustainability indicators differ from traditional indicators of social,
economic, and environmental progress that measure changes in one domain
(e.g., air quality) by seeking to reflect interconnections among many areas,
enabling a more systemic, comprehensive, and multidisciplinary perspective.
Some useful proxy indicators of sustainability have been pioneered, the "eco35
footprint" concept being the most promising.' Indicators as a policy tool are
not new. Classic indicators include inflation rates or unemployment levelssuch powerful and recognizable indicators of economic performance that they
may bring governments down.
132. Douglas Birsch & John Fielder, The Ford Pinto Case:A Study in Applied Ethics, Business, and
Technology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994)..
133. Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
134. See generally OECD, Towards SustainableDevelopment: Indicators to Measure Progress (Paris:
OECD, 2000); Simon Bell & Stephen Morse, Sustainability Indicators:Measuringthe
Immeasurable (London: Earthscan, 2008).
135. Mathis Wackernagel & William Rees, Our EcologicalFootprint:Reducing Human Impact on
the Earth (Gabriola Island: New Society, 1996).
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Efforts to design sustainability metrics have occurred at various scales,
ranging from the global level down to the local community, company, and
project levels.136 Indicators at business-unit levels are complicated as their
robustness requires an account of business supply-chain and product life-cycle
effects.' 37 Ratings of corporate social and environmental performance have
become crucial for the SRI industry, providing the basis for portfolio selections.
A vast research industry has mushroomed to develop corporate sector sustainability
indicators.138 Yet, their competitive proliferation and lack of regulatory oversight
and coherence have hindered their reliability, and they have so far not had much
effect in altering the dominant business case approach to SRI.'39
A further weakness of current approaches is that sustainability indicators
for financial institutions' portfolios as a whole have not been adequately
designed. In 2000, a consortium of German and Swiss banks created a set of
environmental indicators for the financial sector, but declined to set indicators
for the ecological effects associated with financial transactions.' Their report
explained that, apart from methodological problems in setting such indicators,
"it is the client's primary responsibility to document these changes to the
environment .... ""' The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides a useful
starting point for designing robust sustainability indicators and performance
standards for the financial sector. Although primarily a template for corporatelevel reporting, the GRI has a financial sector supplement that acknowledges
the environmental effects of financial transactions.'42 One innovative attempt to

136. Justin Keeble, Sophie Topiol & Simon Berkeley, "Using Indicators to Measure Sustainability
Performance at a Corporate and Project Level" (2003) 44 J. Bus. Ethics 149.
137. Dicksen Tanzil and Beth Beloff, "Assessing Impacts: Overview of Sustainability Indicators
and Metrics" (2006) 15:4 Envtl. Quality Mgmt. 41.
138. Henry Schafer et al., Who is Who in CorporateSocial Responsibility Rating? (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2006).
139. Asa Skillius and Urlika Wennberg, Continuity, Credibility and Comparability:Key Challenges
for CorporateEnvironmentalPerformanceMeasurement and Communication (Lund: Lund
University, 1998), s. 5.2.
140. Oliver Schmid-Sch6nbein and Arthur Braunschweig, EPI-Finance2000: Environmental
PerformanceIndicatorsforthe FinancialIndustry (Zurich: E2 Management Consulting, 2000).
141. Ibid. at 12.
142. GRI, FinancialServices Sector Supplement: EnvironmentalPerformance- Pilot Version 1.0
(Amsterdam: GRI, 2005).
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quantify an important externality of an entire investment portfolio is Trucost's
annual "carbon counts" survey, which measures and ranks UK investment
13
funds according to the carbon intensity of their portfolios. 4 Its recent
evaluation of 185 investment funds found that one-quarter of the so-called SRI
funds polluted more than industry benchmarks. A portfolio's total carbon
footprint is one of the most seminal indicators of sustainability.
There may be an assumption that if individual firms are acceptable enough
to form part of a sustainable portfolio, it follows that the fin ancial institution is
also acting sustainably. Erroneously, this assumption would not reflect aspects
of a financial institution's management systems relevant for ethical investment,
such as the democratic quality of its decision making. If many companies are
rated by the SRI industry for the quality of their corporate governance, so too
should their financial sponsors. Those decision-making systems are important
indicators of future performance, whereas most sustainability indicators are
lagging indicators tracking only historic impacts."' Furthermore, evaluating
environmental impacts at a portfolio level rather than merely an individual firm
level may help provide a holistic picture, consistent with the universal investor
thesis, such as that of business supply chains and product life-cycle impacts.
Of course, sustainability indicators and new social accounting systems will
not capture all issues involved in ethical investment. Some policy issues are too
complex for these methods, at least for now. For instance, environmental
sustainability implies social equity (the principle of "intragenerational equity"),
14
which is problematic for financial markets that exacerbate inequalities. 1 While
investment fiduciaries may be able to effectively respond to discrete social
problems, such as divesting from firms that exploit child labour or practise
racially discriminatory hiring, fiduciaries can hardly address pervasive social and
economic inequalities inherent in a capitalist economy. Different forms of
public regulation must respond to such challenges.

143. Trucost, Carbon Counts 2007" The Carbon Footprint Ranking of UK Investment (London:
Trucost, 2007).
144. Marc Epstein & Priscilla Wisner, "Using a Balanced Scorecard to Implement Sustainability"
(2001) 11:2 Envtl. Quality Mgmt. 1.
145. See Julian Agyeman, Robert Bullard & Bob Evans, Just Sustainabilities: Development in an
Unequal World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993).
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Both sustainability indicators and social accounting therefore can provide
tools for fiduciary duties to further ethical investment. The question of how
those duties should be framed is canvassed next.
2.

THE SPECTRUM OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR SRI

i.

DISCRETIONARY STANDARDS

Redolent of business case SRI, the minimalist option in reframing fiduciary duties
would expressly authorize fiduciaries to consider social and environmental factors
when they are viewed as financially material. As previously noted, materiality
implies that there be tangible financial risks or investment opportunities. For
example, trustees of a pension fund investing for the long term might respond to
climate change risks by including more renewable energy and clean technology
firms in their portfolio. Arguably, this approach is already allowable, indeed
essential, if environmental risks jeopardize short-term returns." 6 Such a reform to
fiduciary duties would put the matter beyond doubt.
Already some jurisdictions authorize SRI as a legitimate adjunct
consideration. Legislation in the state of Connecticut provides that controllers of
the Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds may consider the
environmental and social implications of investments. 14 7 Its latest 2007
investment policy contains provisions which suggest it prioritizes such factors
when selecting assets, voting proxies, and other similar actions. 148 Two Canadian
provinces, Manitoba and Ontario, provide further examples. In 1995, Manitoba's
Trustee Act was amended to permit trustees to consider non-financial criteria in
their investment policies, so long as "the trustee exercises the judgment and care
that a person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would. exercise in
administering the property of others."1 9 In 2005, a similar provision was grafted
into Manitoban pension legislation. 5 Ontario's former South African Trust
146. See e.g. Jane Ambachtsheer et al., Fiduciary Guide to Toxic Chemical Risk (Oakland: Rose
Foundation for Communities and the Environment & the Investor Environmental Health
Network, 2007).
147. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-13d(a) (2002).
148. State of Connecticut Office of the Treasurer, Investment Policy Statementfor the State of
Connecticut Retirement Plansand Trust Fund (State of Connecticut Office of the Treasurer,
2007) (see e.g. "Appendix B: Domestic/Global Proxy Voting Policies" at 32).
149. TrusteeAct, S.M. 1995, s. 79.1.
150. Pension Benefits AmendmentAct, S.M. 2005, s. 28.1(2.2).
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Investments Act of 1988 permitted a trustee to eschew investments in companies
doing business in South Africa, despite any effect on investment returns."'
In a corporate context, the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed a
similar reformulation of directors' fiduciary duties. Peoples Department Stores v.
Wise was a suit brought by the trustee in bankruptcy representing various trade
creditors who argued that an arrangement agreed to by defendant directors
concerning two firms under their control had violated duties to trade
creditors.152 The Court interpreted the phrase "best interests of the corporation"
in section 122(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act as being
distinguishable from the best interests of shareholders. Accordingly, it ruled that
it was appropriate for directors to consider factors beyond the maximization of
shareholder value, including "employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers,
governments and the environment."' Constituency1 statutes in the US attempt
to achieve similar effects through explicit legislation. 14
Perhaps the main advantage of a discretionary approach is that it enables
fiduciaries to respond proactively, rather than reactively, to the social and
environmental impacts of investment. Fiduciaries could confidently initiate
steps to promote sustainable development, rather than merely react as material
environmental risks and liabilities arise. It would also offer the most politically
feasible option for SRI-minded regulators.
Conversely, the principal constraint of this fiduciary standard is that it does
not oblige consideration of societal interests. It would problematically treat
ethical precepts to protect ecological integrity as discretionary considerations to
be weighed against existing business imperatives. There would be no obvious
sanctions for failing to promote sustainable development unless investment
policies recklessly hurt beneficiaries' financial returns. Nor would such a
fiduciary standard necessarily allow affected outsiders to enforce their interests.
In the case of Peoples Department Stores, the Court stressed the difference
between taking the interests of various parties into account and owing a duty to
those parties. The duty of loyalty that a director owes remains to the

151. R.S.O. 1990 (repealed in 1997).
152. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461.
153. Ibid. at 481-82.
154. James Hanks Jr., "Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s"
(1991) 21 Stetson L. Rev. 97.
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corporation itself, not other parties.' This may make the legal recognition and
protection of other interests functionally unenforceable.
ii. PROCESS STANDARDS

Alternatively, legislation could prescribe procedures to improve the likelihood that
fiduciaries would consider the social and environmental impacts of their
investment decisions."5 6 This approach is already evident in some jurisdictions
where lawmakers have introduced transparency regulation requiring certain types
of funds to publicly report their SRI policies. In several. jurisdictions, legislative
proposals have been tabled that would impose more onerous procedural
standards. These include the UK's CorporateResponsibility Bill,5 ' and Australia's
CorporateCode of Conduct Bill,'58 neither of which has been adopted as of yet. 59
. Among the possible ambitious procedural reforms, financiers could be obliged
not only to disclose their SRI policies, but also their investment methodology and
implementation efforts, and where applicable, they could explain why they have
not adhered to specified best practices. Authorities should also devote more
resources to enforcing transparency obligations. Financiers' disclosures on SRI
could be audited independently, and deficiencies penalized. More invasively,
authorities could also allow outside stakeholders to have a voice in financial
institutions' governance, as representatives of particular social and environfiiental
interests or constituencies. For large pension funds, this could involve stakeholder
representatives sitting on governing boards. Less prominently, fiduciaries could be
required to consult and consider the interests of specific stakeholders who do not
have formal representation in fund management. Already, the Equator Principles
require signatory banks to ensure that local communities who may be affected are
consulted in planning projects they finance.
One rationale for these reforms is that the governing boards of pension
trusts, investment funds, and banks are typically drawn from a narrow segment
155. Supra note 152 at 4 82-83.
156. Gunther Teubner, "Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Their Beneficiaries" in K.J. Hopt & G.
Teubner, eds., CorporateGovernance and Directors'Liabilities(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1985) 165 at 166.
157. Bill 129, CorporateResponsibility Bill, 2002-2003 Sess., 2003.
158. CorporateCode of Conduct Bill 2000 (Cth).
159. Adam McBeth, "A Look at Corporate Code of Conduct Legislation" (2004) 33 Common L.
World Rev. 222.
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of society, unrepresentative of its main groups. The governing boards
commonly lack expertise on SRI issues and do not adequately understand
modern social and environmental challenges.16 ' Appropriately chosen
representatives of various social and environmental constituencies could
strengthen the ethical envelope of investment. Even nature itself could have a
voice, in a manner analogous to Stone's suggestion for authorities to appoint
guardians to represent the interests of ecosystems. 611 Stakeholder representatives
of course could not have a voice without being accountable. They too would
need to be bound by fiduciary obligations. More representative governing
boards may be better informed of the challenges of aligning private investment
with public responsibilities to ensure sustainability. They provide a means to
democratically diversify the range of perspectives that inform SRI policy, and
thereby bolster the social legitimacy of ethical investment decisions.
Advancing SRI in these ways does have some limitations. 1 2 The potential
multitude of interests runs counter to arguments that efficient institutions are
endowed with clear, single-purpose functions, where governance procedures are
Where a fiduciary must
not compromised by competing considerations.'
its obligations, any
prioritizing
of
any
way
without
consider numerous interests
decision taken that is not blatantly self-interested becomes defensible. Because
of the extreme breadth of interests to "balance," a stakeholder would struggle to
prove that the fiduciary was derelict in his or her duties. The fiduciary
relationship crumbles where the loyalty of the fiduciary splinters among
multiple parties or stakeholders whose interests may not coincide. Though
reforms to democratize governance within financial institutions would allow for

160. See the survey in Chris Gribben & Matthew Gitsham, Will UKPension Funds Become More
Responsible:A Survey of Trustees (London: UKSIF, 2006).
161. Christopher Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects" (1972) 45 S.Cal. L. Rev. 450.
162. For a sample of the literature from the corporate social responsibility perspective, see Thomas
Donaldson & Lee Preston, "The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts,
Evidence, and Implications" (1995) 20 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 65; Ciaran Driver and Grahame
Thompson, "Corporate Governance and Democracy: The Stakeholder Debate Revisited"
(2002) 6 J. Mgmt. & Governance 111.
163. See Michael Jensen, A Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims, and Organizational
Forms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
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dialogue among these various interests, it is likely that the will of the majority,
rather than a consensus, would emerge.
Alternatively, the financial sector could accommodate a voice for
stakeholders in a single external entity, such as a national ethics council
responsible for setting general investment standards. The state could appoint a
body of representatives from key constituencies to devise standards for ethical
investment for sustainable development. Fiduciaries would receive guidance on
difficult ethical questions, avoiding trial and error. This option would be most
acceptable for public financial institutions (e.g., public investment funds,
national savings schemes, and export credit agencies). Already, Sweden and
Norway have established ethics councils to guide their public pension funds
according to international environmental and social standards. The private
sector might tolerate an ethics panel with a more restrained mandate, such as
setting general guidance and voluntary standards.
Overall, process standards dovetail closely with the prescriptions of
reflexive law theory, which aim to promote self-regulation within businesses by
restructuring their internal decision making to facilitate more consideration of
the interests of other stakeholders andsocial norms. 11 With the vision that
governance should no longer arise out of external regulation but should occur
through the internal reconfiguration of decision making within corporations,
detailed regulatory prescription is thus replaced by mechanisms encouraging
internal reflection, learning, and behavioural changes. The function of law is
recast from direct control to "procedural" control.'
The principal concern is that existing procedural reforms in the SRI
industry have yet to engender significant change. They have allowed financiers
to assert SRI policies without actually needing to demonstrate real change. This
setback is possible because such reforms have not gone far enough, and have
instead left too much discretion in the hands of financiers. As noted, a vast
range of options has yet to be tested.
Possibly the most significant reason to include these process reforms is that
they would enable more democratic decision making within financial

164. Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farner & Decian Murphy, eds., EnvironmentalLaw and Ecological
Responsibility: The Concept andPracticeofEcologicalSelf-Organisation(London: John Wiley &
Sons, 1994); Eric Orts, "Reflexive Environmental Law," (1995) 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227.
165. Julia Black, "Proceduralising Regulation: Part I," (2000) 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 597.
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institutions, which is crucial to promoting ethical deliberation and creating'
firmer commitment to ethical principles. The democratic basis would lead to an
answer to the criticism of "whose ethics?", and it would also bolster the social
legitimacy and the authority of SRI as a means of market governance. The most
democratically structured financial institutions are credit unions, and it is
probably no coincidence that they provide examples of some of the best
community and environmental financing."' The Vancouver City Savings
Credit Union is a leader in the Canadian SRI market."6 7
iii.

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

Moving along the spectrum of possible reforms, a general fiduciary duty to act
for sustainable development or ecological integrity could be legislated.
Designing a credible performance standard with sufficient clarity is not easy; an
undefined duty "to have regard to" or "to promote" sustainability would hardly
suffice. Like the sustainability discourse itself, such a vague yardstick subject to
discretionary interpretations would likely perpetuate business as usual and allow
problematic trade-offs. It would therefore require prophylactic rules defining
the standard of care and determining to whom duties are owed. If achievable, it
could provide a powerful means to transform the financial sector.
Investing in an ostensibly lawful activity would not necessarily suffice for
such a fiduciary standard. For instance, an emission license does not necessarily
shield a polluter from other legal actions such as tort suits. 16 8 Further, no simple
distinction between a permissible and prohibited activity exists in this area;
typically, corporate activities or products are controlled, subject to impact
assessments, permits, and other regulatory checks. In some countries with
rudimentary systems of environmental law, even an expressly permissible
activity may run afoul of elementary international sustainability standards.
Mandatory legislation for corporate social responsibility in the context of
company or financial regulation is not unprecedented. Among sparse examples,
the UK's Companies Act of 2006 comes "close to a stakeholder model of

166. Bernd Balkenhol, ed., Credit Unions andthe Poverty Challenge. Outreach, Enhancing

Sustainability (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1999).
167. See Vancity, online: <https://www.vancity.com>.
168. See e.g. the cases of Mandrake Management v. Toronto Transit Commission (1993), 102
D.L.R. (4th) 12 (Ont. C.A.); Wheeler v. JJ Saunders Ltd. (1994), [1996] Ch. 19 (C.A.).
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director's duties," according to some legal commentators.169 The applicable
part section 172(1), states:
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and the environment.

170

The UK reforms do not accommodate non-shareholder interests in actual
corporate governance, yet oblige directors to consider how environmental and
social impacts affect corporate success. Breach of this duty could make a
transaction voidable and result in civil liability for directors. Applied to
financial institutions, such as pension funds, this standard could help to
redefine fiduciary duties along the lines of the "universal owner" thesis.1 7 ' The
financial success of institutional investors, who have a stake in much of the
economy, is even more likely to be affected by diverse social and environmental
interests than that of a single corporation operating in a discrete sector.
From a sustainability policy perspective, obliging financial institutions to
consider social and environmental issues to the extent they affect investment
returns has certain limitations. The focus remains on profitability of the
financial institution and, ultimately, its beneficiaries. Without other measures,
this approach to fiduciary duties could still suppress social and environmental
considerations. Most fundamentally, while institutional investors ("universal
owners") may respond to externalities of individual companies that create costs
elsewhere in the economy, they may be blind to externalities of the market as a
whole, such as long-term climate change. Moreover, the tendency to delegate
investment management to specialist fund managers with short-term
performance targets, coupled with reliance on corporate valuation models that

169. Cynthia Williams & John Conley, "Triumph or Tragedy: The Curious Path of Corporate
Disclosure Reform in the UK" (2007) 31 Wn. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 317 at 354.
170. CompaniesAct (2006)(U.K.), 2006, c. 46, s. 172(1).
171. Hawley & Williams, supra note 22; Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik & David Pitt-Watson,
The New Capitalists:How Citizen Investors are Reshaping the CorporateAgenda (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2006).
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do not measure economic factors holistically, further constrains this approach
in the absence of additional measures.
Improvements to social accounting and sustainability indicators could
make a mandatory performance standard workable for ethical investment. The
-fiduciary's obligation could remain to serve the interests of its beneficiary
investors, but only so long as specified social and environmental impacts are
accounted for and the ecological footprint of an investment portfolio remains
within tolerable thresholds. Sustainability indicators could be prescribed by
regulation to effectively set performance benchmarks for.fiduciaries, such as the
carbon footprint of a portfolio and other broad indicators enabling a fuller view
of environmental performance. Fiduciaries would not be required to calculate
the social and environmental costs and benefits of investments under this
approach. Rather, they would be required to ensure that the overall portfolio
adheres to indicators of sustainability by whatever means they choose.
Advantages of performance standards based on sustainability indicators are that
they can set clear, achievable benchmarks for financiers while avoiding
prescribed methods for arriving at set results.
Alternatively, performance standards could require financiers to ensure
their investment portfolios account for and make deductions for social and
environmental costs ascertained through new social accounting standards."7 2
With the spread of economic instruments ascribing monetary value to
environmental behaviour, such as carbon taxes and tradable emission permits,
quantification of some externalities should improve to help financiers find the
most cost effective ways to meet ethical investment standards. While the costbenefit calculus may seem controversial to some environmental ethicists, the
calculus would apply only to how to achieve an ethical standard rather than to
the determination of the content of that standard.
Thus, through these approaches, the fiduciary standard would effectively
prioritize ecological integrity over private investment returns. While investors
could continue to be legally conceived as the sole beneficiaries of such fiduciary
duties, their "best interests" would be redefined so that diminishing
172. Edward Zelinsky, "The Dilemma of the Local Social Investment: An Essay on 'Socially
Responsible Investment'" (1984-85) 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 111 at 130-31; Kathleen Herbohn,
"A Full Cost Environmental Accounting Experiment" (2005) 30 Acct. Org. & Soc'y 519;
and Julie Desjardins & Alan Willis, EnvironmentalPerformance:MeasuringandManaging
What Matters (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2001).
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sustainability would no longer be a viable means of obtaining financial gain.
While some values and practices, particularly in areas such as human rights,
may defy measurement in social accounting or simplification into indicators;
supplementary tools, such as duties to conduct social impact assessments and
consult with affected stakeholders, might assist.
Such reforms, however, would prove very controversial, even to seasoned
practitioners of SRI, and would be very complex to implement. Yet, ultimately
they are surely essential steps to safeguard ecological integrity. Finance capitalism
as it presently functions likely has no future if humankind is to have one. In the
near term, interim steps could be taken, such as adopting specific ecological
criteria for greenhouse gas emissions. A vast industry is rapidly evolving to
measure and account for such emissions, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project173
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14064 standard. 74
C.

COLLATERAL REFORMS

Some of the collateral measures necessary to support a reformulation of
financiers' fiduciary duties for SRI can be briefly canvassed. While the
following measures certainly could be construed as tools for furthering the
business case for SRI, they also provide the means to enable financiers to more
readily achieve fiduciary standards for safeguarding ecological integrity.
Economic instruments, such as pollution taxes, emission allowance trading,
and discrete subsidies, can strengthen SRI by pricing social and environmental
externalities into the cost of development capital. In conjunction with social
accounting reforms, economic instruments can attribute quantified negative
and positive externalities to firms, for reflection in their earnings,
competitiveness, and, ultimately, share prices and other financial indicators.
This in turn should influence the allocation of capital, making polluters
competitively disadvantaged. While a system of SRI governance nurturing
ethical investment cannot rest only on a system of monetary incentives, it is one
of the most politically viable reforms. The Netherlands' tax incentive for green
project investments catalyzed the Dutch SRI market, accounting for about half

173. See Carbon Disclosure Project, online: <http://www.cdproject.net>.
174. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14064-1: 2006, Greenhousegases - Part
1: Specification with guidance at the organizationlevelfor the quantificationand reportingof
greenhousegas emissions and removals (Geneva: ISO, 2006).
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of all its SRI."7 5 Taxes can also reward long-term investment by targeting
appropriate financial transactions. Meaningful taxes on short-term gains on
trading shares, applied on a decreasing scale as the holding period lengthens,
must be assessed.
Financier liability provides another means to penalize creditors or
shareholders for the environmental and social harms they finance. Liability
could arise where an institutional shareholder acting alone or in concert was in
a position to exert significant influence, or where a lender disregarded due
diligence requirements for assessing a borrower's environmental safeguards.
Faced with such risks, fiduciaries must factor the costs of potential liability into
any investment decisions made. In the US, lender liability under the
"Superfund" legislation for cleanup of contaminated lands had some positive
effects on the environmental behaviour of banks." 6 However, as a reactive and
adversarial tool, liability should not be the primary route to ethical investment.
Many social and environmental problems are so numerous, diffused, and
intertwined that the individual causal linkages between acts and damages are
too remote to impose liability according to evidential rules in courts. The
liability model also assumes that governments worldwide can create a
comprehensive system of command regulation capturing and appropriately
penalizing all costly externalities. Environmental liability, however, should
retain a role in some situations to make financiers more accountable for harms
that they are closely associated with.
Among other collateral reforms for SRI, at an international level, a new
treaty setting social and environmental standards for global finance would be
beneficial. With foreign ownership of stock markets increasing, SRI governance
cannot hinge solely on national standards.' International financial market
regulation would help to prevent a race to the bottom, as common standards
would preclude capital fleeing to the most regulatorily benign markets. The
175. Bert Scholtens, "What Drives Socially Responsible Investment? The Case of the
Netherlands" (2005) 13 Sust. Dev. 129.
176. Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. % 96019675 (2000); see Joseph Jude Norton, "Lender Liability in the United States: A Decade in
Perspective" in Ross Cranston, ed., Banks, Liability andRisk (London: Lloyds of London
Press, 1995) 329.
177. World Resources Institute, Tomorrow's Markets - Global Trends and their Implicationsfor
Business (Washington: World Resources Institute, 2002) at 54.
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existing range of international voluntary standards, such as the UNPRI or the
Equator Principles, fall short of the exacting standards required with regard to
both substantive performance standards and procedural controls, including
public disclosures, auditing, and grievance mechanisms. Reforms to fiduciary
duties outlined earlier in this article could be set as international standards for
states worldwide to adopt in their domestic legislation. There are no doubt steep
political obstacles to such an international treaty, as the fate of the proposed UN
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations illustrates.178
Finally, public sector finance must set an example for SRI. Some
commentators herald public pension funds as "a potentially powerful catalyst for
change" towards sustainable development.' Short of a command economy,
states should at least mobilize public capital to address strategic social and
environmental issues, as occurs to some extent in the national pension plans of
Scandinavia and France. Beyond empowering public pension funds as SRI
leaders, states could also influence capital allocation through central banks, giving
preferential treatment to environmentally critical industries. In an international
context, foreign aid and multilateral development investment provide further
nodes for sustainable development financing. 8 Co-financing partnerships
between public and private institutions, sometimes used in multilateral finance,
offer a novel way by which governments can guide private financiers to behave
more responsibly.' Environmentally conditioned public finance on preferential
terms could bridge the cost gap between what private financiers wish to commit
and what is necessary for environmentally sustainable investments.

178. UN Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business
Enterpriseswith Regard to Human Rights, UN ESCOR, 2003, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2003/12/Rev.2.
179. David Hess, "Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier
of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development" (2007) [Working Paper No.
1080, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan] at 42.
180. Among the literature, see Finn Tarp, ForeignAid and Development. Lessons Learnedand
Directionsfor the Future (New York: Routledge, 2000); Gunther Handl, Multilateral
Development Banking: EnvironmentalPrinciplesand Concepts Reflecting General International
Law andPublicPolicy (London: Kluwer Law International, 2001).
181. See Hillary French, Investing in the Future: HarnessingPrivate CapitalFlowsfor
Environmentally SustainableDevelopment (Washington: Worldwatch Institute, 1998). •
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V. CONCLUSIONS
SRI both impeaches and challenges financial markets. It indicts long-standing
investment practices for impairing ecological health and social justice. It also
presents an opportunity to reform those practices to respect social and
environmental values so essential to the long-term health of the economy.
Despite some recent growth of the SRI market, most financial institutions
have not heeded this message. Rather, they largely perpetuate business as
usual by evaluating ecological necessities from the perspective of financial
advantage, while discreetly rejecting deeper ethical questions about the
investment process." 2 The business case model of SRI sanguinely transforms
the tensions between environmental protection and profitable investment
into a harmonious arrangement. Of course, that environmental care and
financial prosperity can be compatible is not an objectionable proposition, in
principle. Financiers should benefit from companies that reduce their
ecological footprint.
The qualm is that some financiers masquerading as responsible investors
will just tinker with unsustainable modes of development. Tied to a concept of
financial materiality, the business case may address some environmental
problems through improved research and analysis. However, it cannot
accommodate ecological issues that are not valued by the market, and it
promotes trade-offs when prioritizing financial gains to private investors.
Concomitantly, business reputational risks may provide a flimsy basis for
assuring ethical conduct. One reason is that the marketplace has a short
institutional memory; for instance, how many remember that Lee Iacocca was
the man behind the Ford Pinto? Many corporate reputation-enhancing
measures are superficial, and the public image of responsible behaviour often
masks a different reality.183
Thus, without demonstrated financial advantage, an investment analysis
may advocate delaying or halting measures that mitigate pollution, especially in
the absence of effective government regulation and stakeholder pressure. In fact,
in corporate decision making a countervailing business case for intensifying
182. David Owen, "Towards a Theory of Social Investment: A Review Essay" (1990) 15 Acct.
Org. & Soc'y 249 at 259-64.
183. George Pitcher, "Corporate Responsibility Isn't Always About Charity" Marketing Week (14
March, 2002) 33.
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environmentally unsustainable practices may be evaluated. For example, despite
the SRI industry's rhetoric about climate change risks, the fossil fuel industry
has hardly changed. The surge of investment in Alberta's oil sands is one
controversial example.' 84 Without an additional layer of ethical responsibility,
many financiers lack incentive to take actions beyond those prescribed by a
conservative business case.
The belief that economic investment can best contribute to prosperity
and human welfare when financial institutions have the unfettered freedom to
determine their own goals must be rejected. Achieving the potential of SRI
requires many changes, foremost of which is to reframe the governance of
financial institutions to facilitate or mandate ethical investing for
sustainability. The market alone is unlikely to create adequate signals for
change. There must be stronger environmental regulatory and civil society
pressure and democratic debate. As a priority, SRI should evaluate companies
with reference to enhancing sustainability and invest in those leading
companies irrespective of short-term, bottom-line results. The only
permissible financial returns should be those achieved without unaccountedfor public costs to the environment and social welfare. SRI certainly does not
mean financial returns are rendered unimportant; rather, the focus of the
investment objectives should be over the long term, so that in the long-term
interests of the financial market itself, natural and social capital are not
degraded. The sustainability of the financial sector ultimately depends on the
sustainability of life.
Ethically driven investment realistically cannot address all sustainability
challenges, as some are too complex to be packaged into social accounting
metrics or sustainability indicators, or are simply better managed directly
through state protective legislation. On the institutional side, some financiers
will remain better placed than others to champion SRI. Public sector pension
plans, cooperative banks, credit unions, and some religious groups, with closer
ties to civil society and more democratic methods of governance, will likely
continue to set the pace.
Booming emerging markets pose further crucial challenges to SRI. In
November 2007, PetroChina surpassed the US energy behemoth Exxon Mobil

184. Kirk Makin, "High-stakes Battle Looms over Oil-Sands Pollution" The Globe andMail (15
August 2007) Al.
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as the world's largest corporation measured by the market value of its total
stock.185 PetroChina's investments in Sudan and other contentious places have
been associated with human rights abuses and environmental problems. 8 6 As a
largely Western discourse and practice, SRI will require fresh ideas' and
techniques to influence firms such as PetroChina in emerging economies.
Global sustainability is impossible unless SRI can speak to the concerns of
communities and investors in the developing world. SRI networks such as
Association for Sustainable and Responsible Investment should thus be crucial
for pioneering SRI in these regions.' 87
A robust framework for such ethical investment necessitates many changes
to SRI governance. Among the menu of reforms for environmental law, the
reformulation of financiers' fiduciary duties is crucial. They define the core
goals and processes of decision making within financial institutions. Through
fiduciary duties the traditional concept of "benefit" to investors can be ethically
redefined, and financiers thereby steered toward sustainability. If grounded in
new forms of social accounting, sustainability indicators, and performance
standards, such fiduciary standards could bring financiers much nearer to a
system of ethical investment that respects ecological integrity.
If financial markets continue to ignore imperatives for reform, more radical
solutions may have to be implemented to secure our future.'88 Timothy
Flannery, in The Weather Makers, warns of a hypothetical "carbon dictatorship"
where an "Earth Commission for Thermostatic Control" controls the economy
to safeguard a looming climate crisis.'89 Ethical investment, if followed
seriously, could help avert such bitter alternatives. Financial markets have
185. Donald Greenlees and David Lague, "PetroChina Shares Triple Value in Record IPO"
InternationalHerald Tribune (5 November 2007).
186. See "The China-Sudan Connection: Options for Concerned Investors" (Session at 18th Annual
SRI in the Rockies Conference, Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico, 3-6 November 2007).
187. See The Association for Sustainable and Responsible Investment in Asia, online:
<http://www.asria.org/>.
188. See the suggestions of Michael Jacobs, The Green Economy: Environment, Sustainable
Development and the Politics of the Future (London: Pluto Press, 1991) at 45; Hazel
Henderson, Paradigmsin Progress:Life Beyond Economics (Indianapolis: Knowledge Systems,
1991); and J.E. Lovelock, Gaia:A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979).
189. Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers: How Man Is Changingthe Climate and What It Means
For Life on Earth (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005) at 290-95.
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become the single most important sector of the global economy, and reducing
their ecological footprint through credible legal standards for SRI may yield a
better dividend than any other environmental law strategy currently available.

